I have taken the arduous task of reading the whole decision text today and through several translations, the court did find the the repeal of the counting method constitutional in D5 and provided several defenses in favor of the legislator (the parliament) and against the applicant (PS). They relied heavily on the fact that it was exceptional as evidenced by the exposition of intention which accompanied the amendments back in 2024, which admitted that the intention was to compensate for the delays caused by AIMA. In every contested point brought by PS the court defended the legislation except for the point related to the situation where by the disappearance of the previous law some applicants will see their accumulated time reduced retrospectively, to this point the ruling deferred judgment on this case to D7 because it was a question of transition between successive laws and not the constitutionality of the repeal which is prescriptive in nature.
So, by simply reading the whole decision points under D5 one may conclude the repeal is constitutional but it is wrong to assume that there cannot be a transitional (grandfathering) rule for those who already saw their residence time increase under existing framework. The reason becomes clear in the analysis of D7 which concerns the transition framework.
In D7, the court decided the transition regime is unconstitutional. It provided several defenses in favor of the applicant (PS) and against the legislator (the parliament) including cases affected by change in the counting method. See below:
Now, by reference pending proceedings, without prejudice to the fact that the applicant is aware, at the time of the submission of the application pursuant to Article 6(1) LdN, which legal diploma could soon be amended, in the sense of a greater requirement, knew the applicant who could count on that, in the procedure which had already initiated, in the then-current regime, the fact constitutive of his request of acquisition of nationality by naturalization would be the decision of the authority competent public, with all other consequences well illustrated by the case law of the instances already mentioned.
Just as it could count, in the situation referred to in Article 15(4) LdN, that the method of counting of your legal period of residence, as a de facto situation to have in account for the deferral of your request, would be the one that resulted from the regime in force at the time of the request and not another.
Watch what ends of exposing themselves, and by not offering reasons for the need for a that, in reality, is a , At the same time it is natural that the applicant, awaiting the decision of the applications he has already submitted, invest in the confidence generated by legislative behavior, from the outset because a decision to obtain citizenship is a structuring decision in the life of any person.
Verified a situation of trust attributable to the legislator, it remains to determine whether the frustration of expectations legitimate applicants in the applicability of the scheme that is extracted from the legislation in force on the date of submission of the application may be justified by reasons of public interest or for other constitutional considerations relevant. It is a judgment of proportionality, in which ponders the severity of the sacrifice of confidence and the weight of the reasons for this sacrifice.
As shown above the court did find the transition regime insufficient to protect the trust and confidence of the applicants in the legal framework, including the case of applicants with time periods counted under the previous framework no longer eligible. You will not find a sentence that says “Hey, you must put a transition regime for people who had delays” because TC is not a legislator and it is not their business to direct parliament on what to put in the transition article, they only need to specify that it breaches trust and confidence to conclude that it was insufficient from a constitutional perspective. They provided examples, including an example of someone who had already accumulated 5 years using the old counting formula, but they are not obligated to cite and mention every possible example. Not explicitly mentioning someone who has accumulated a portion does not mean they were not a possible example, and they were right to use the example of someone who has accumulated the 5 years fully because that was a strong defense argument, not that someone who has 4 years and some months was not worthy of protection.
The parliament cannot pass a revision without a transitional regime because that is required under the constitution.
What this means is that GV investors who have already applied and who have already obtained the residence permit PRIOR to the effective date of the final revision of this law can expect to count their time from application date. Otherwise it will be from card date, because the TC did not find a legitimate expectation for this class people in D5 as they are not reasonably believed to have had the intention to request nationality before they applied and were granted a residence permit (i.e. you still don’t know if you will be allowed in Portugal) and also because the previous law stipulated that the request must be approved to benefit from this exception. It would also be illegal to extend the operation of a repealed law indefinitely in the future as such would deprive parliament of its legislative power.
Those biometrics appointments in January, February and March are very valuable it seems.